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ABSTRACT
Bankruptcy law establishes proceedings designed to rehabilitate
debtors while protecting creditors, but a series of safe harbors
effectively exempts from bankruptcy proceedings certain financial
contracts known as derivatives. Accordingly, when a party to a
derivative contract goes bankrupt, the counterparty may terminate the
contract and seize what it is owed from the debtor’s assets. Congress
enacted these safe harbors to combat the risk of systemic failure by
maintaining liquidity in troubled markets; in doing so, however, they
allowed counterparties to engage in opportunistic behavior and
inefficiently consume a debtor’s limited assets. Because these two
consequences may harm the debtor and its creditors, the safe harbors
may merely substitute one kind of systemic risk for another.
This Note argues that these safe harbors might more effectively
combat systemic risk if they did not permit counterparties to terminate
derivatives that are more valuable to the debtor. This is likely true of
an insurance-like derivative known as the credit default swap (CDS).
Just as insurance contracts may not be terminated—because
maintaining insurance is crucial both to debtor rehabilitation and
creditor protection—certain CDSs should not be eligible for
termination under the safe harbors. Narrowing the safe harbors might
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help eliminate unnecessary costs arising from bankruptcy and thereby
better reduce systemic risk.

INTRODUCTION
Two thousand and eight was “the year the financial system
1
stopped working.” The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the federal
takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the near failure and
subsequent bailout of Bear Stearns and American International
Group (AIG) triggered huge losses on Wall Street and across the
2
country, signaling even to lay observers that the subprime mortgage
crisis had metastasized into a serious threat to the American
3
economy. These failures were largely symptomatic of the steep
4
decline in value of securities backed by subprime mortgages, but
only a portion of the blame lies in the collapse of the subprime
market. In large part, “the [financial] system was vulnerable because
5
of intricate financial contracts known as credit derivatives.” In light
of the role these largely unregulated contracts played in the financial
crisis, state regulators and industry insiders have begun working on
6
reform initiatives to make credit derivatives safer. These initiatives,
7
however, can only address part of the problem. Credit derivatives
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

1. Floyd Norris, A Year of Chaos in Finance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at B1.
2. See id. (cataloging the assorted failures and bailouts of different institutions in 2008).
3. See Economists Call Subprime Fallout Biggest Threat, MSNBC.COM, Mar. 3, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23436696/ (“The cascading fallout from the subprime loan crisis,
barely a cloud on the horizon a year ago, is now viewed by experts as the economy’s gravest
threat.”).
4. See Jenny Anderson & Vikas Bajaj, A Wall St. Domino Theory, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2008, at A1 (linking the subprime mortgage crisis to the failure of Bear Stearns and the huge
losses suffered by other investment banks, including Lehman Brothers); Serena Ng, Swaps
Market Is Pressed to Ease Market Strains, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2008, at C2 (tying the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy to the subprime mortgage crisis).
5. Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Biggest Insurer’s Crisis, a Blind Eye to a Web of Risk,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at A1.
6. See Danny Hakim, New York to Regulate a Financial Tool Behind the Credit Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at C10 (announcing that New York’s insurance department would
begin regulating CDSs as “insurance products” in certain cases); Aline van Duyn, Worries
Remain Even After CDS Clean-Up, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
af1efb78-0dc6-11de-8ea3-0000779fd2ac.html (“Since [the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers], the
industry has pushed through 10 years worth of changes in just a few months.” (quoting
Athanassios Diplas, Managing Director, Deutsche Bank)).
7. State-level initiatives cannot fully address, for example, how derivatives are treated in
bankruptcy proceedings because the Constitution provides that Congress has the power “to
establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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pose a danger to the financial system in part because they are subject
to a series of safe harbors in the Bankruptcy Code that exempts credit
derivatives from bankruptcy safeguards designed to help financially
8
distressed firms recover while protecting their creditors. This Note
argues that narrowing the scope of these safe harbors may reduce the
potential of credit derivatives to harm the financial system.
One of the primary causes of the market turmoil in 2008 was a
9
species of credit derivative known as the credit default swap (CDS).
Generally, a CDS is a private contract in which a seller guarantees a
purchaser (both of these parties are referred to as “counterparties”) a
fixed payment if a predefined credit event occurs (typically a credit
10
downgrade, bond default, or bankruptcy). Many in the financial
services industry viewed CDSs, which have historically been subject
11
12
to little regulation, as unparalleled engines of profit.
For example, AIG made enormous profits selling CDSs as a kind
13
of insurance against losses on mortgage-backed securities, but, as
the subprime mortgage crisis developed, the value of the underlying
F
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8. See, e.g., In re PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc., 324 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Chapter 11
[bankruptcy] is intended to permit the debtor to rehabilitate itself while simultaneously
protecting creditors.”).
9. See, e.g., Anderson & Bajaj, supra note 4 (“Of particular concern are the insurance
contracts known as credit default swaps . . . . Investors in such contracts with [distressed firms]
are closely studying whether they can get out of them or have them transferred to a more stable
firm.”); Shannon D. Harrington, Credit Swap Clearinghouse to Be Running by Year-End,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 14, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&sid=
ahqxOSMiB2bI (“[T]he virtually unregulated . . . market in credit-default swaps has played a
significant role in the credit crisis.” (quoting Christopher Cox, former Chairman, SEC)); Liam
Pleven & Susanne Craig, Congress Grills Former AIG Chiefs: Lawmakers Ask Whether
Executives Glossed over Warnings About Risks Insurer Faced, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2008, at A3
(“[D]erivatives . . . were largely responsible for three consecutive multibillion-dollar quarterly
losses AIG reported in the months before the government agreed to loan the company as much
as $85 billion.”).
10. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (2007).
11. See Harrington, supra note 9 (quoting former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
describing the CDS market as “virtually unregulated”). For a discussion of the regulation (or
lack thereof) of CDSs, see infra Part III.A.
12. See Morgenson, supra note 5. Joseph Cassano, former head of AIG’s Financial
Products division (AIGFP), stated in August 2007 that “[i]t is hard for us, without being
flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason that would see us losing one
dollar in any of those [CDS] transactions.” Id.
13. Id. Between 1999 and 2005, revenue from AIGFP rose from $737 million to $3.26
billion. These profits were primarily derived from selling CDSs on “packages of debt known as
‘collateralized debt obligations.’ . . . [which essentially] were pools of loans sliced into tranches
and sold to investors based on the credit quality of the underlying securities.” Id.
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14

securities plummeted.
Concurrently, AIG’s CDS liabilities
15
16
mounted. These unexpected losses destabilized AIG, sending a
shockwave through AIG’s trading partners, which consisted of a
“‘global swath’ of top-notch entities including ‘banks and investment
banks, pension funds, endowments, foundations, insurance
companies, hedge funds, money managers, high-net-worth
17
individuals, municipalities and sovereigns and supranationals.’” In
light of the importance of AIG’s stable of trading partners, the firm’s
possible failure threatened indeterminate losses to the larger financial
system.
The risk that AIG’s failure could cause a chain of consequences
negatively affecting both market participants and the larger economy
18
is an example of “systemic risk.” Systemic risk concerns prompted
the Federal Reserve to bail out AIG to prevent the likely
19
repercussions of the faltering company’s failure. If AIG had failed,
its web of trading partners would have suffered direct losses resulting
20
from AIG’s inability to meet its obligations. More importantly (for
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14. See AIG, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 30 (Feb. 27, 2008) (“AIG insurance and
financial services subsidiaries invest in mortgage-backed securities and CDOs, in which the
underlying collateral is composed in whole or in part of residential mortgage loans; and AIGFP
provides credit protection through credit default swaps . . . .”); see also First Amended
Complaint at 1, In re AIG, Inc., 2007 Derivative Litig., No. 07-CV-10464 (S.D.N.Y. June 3,
2009) (“[AIG’s officers and directors] steered AIG into writing insurance on complex debt
instruments (based on mortgages) in such a way that the Company would experience
catastrophic losses if such mortgages began to default—as, indeed, occurred.”).
15. See Marine Cole, AIG’s Losses Show Swaps Next Domino, FIN. WK., Feb. 18,
2008, available at http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080218/REG/
794188688 (noting that AIG underwrote over $500 billion in CDSs, with close to $78 billion of
that sum allotted to securitized transactions with value derived from mortgage-backed
securities).
16. In 2007, to reflect the changing values of its assets, AIGFP wrote down its CDS
portfolio by $11.2 billion. AIG, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 28 (Feb. 27, 2008). In the
first nine months of 2008, it wrote down the same portfolio by an additional $21.7 billion. AIG,
Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 3 (Nov. 10, 2008). These write-downs helped trigger a
“liquidity crisis” at AIG and ultimately necessitated its bailout by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York on September 16, 2008. Id. at 50.
17. Morgenson, supra note 5 (quoting Joseph Cassano, former head, AIGFP).
18. See Editorial, Free AIG, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2008, at A18 (stating that the Federal
Reserve “justified its intervention on systemic risk grounds”).
19. See, e.g., Pleven & Craig, supra note 9 (explaining the events leading up to the federal
bailout of AIG); Editorial, Closing the Gaps, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2009, at A12 (“[T]he Federal
Reserve and the Treasury had to step in, lest its giant web of credit-default swaps collapse and
bring the world economy down with it.”).
20. See Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Chief Owns Significant Stake in Goldman, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at B1 (“Had A.I.G. simply declared bankruptcy, the financial institutions
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the purposes of this Note), AIG’s failure also could have triggered a
run on the company’s assets by, among others, its CDS
21
These counterparties could have immediately
counterparties.
terminated their contracts with AIG and fulfilled their claims by
seizing collateral from AIG’s assets, further destabilizing the
company and leaving slower creditors “stuck with a company whose
value took a tremendous dive after counterparties got first dibs on its
22
carcass.”
CDS counterparties are able to terminate their contracts and
seize collateral because a series of safe harbor provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code (collectively known as the “Safe Harbor”) allow
23
them to sidestep normal bankruptcy proceedings. According to the
legislative history of these provisions, Congress crafted the Safe
24
Harbor to reduce systemic risk. In theory, the Safe Harbor works to
reduce the potentially widespread consequences of a default by
maintaining liquidity in troubled markets. Without the Safe Harbor, a
bankruptcy filing would effectively freeze the contractual
relationship, leaving the counterparties exposed to market
25
movements affecting the value of the contract. Because the Safe
F
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F

doing business with it would have ended up in court . . . fighting to get pennies on the dollar for
their claims.”).
21. Marie Beaudette, Bankruptcy for AIG? Think Again, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009,
http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2009/03/18/bankruptcy-for-aig-think-again/. For many readers,
the word “run” (in this context) will conjure up the bank run scene in Frank Capra’s 1946 classic
It’s a Wonderful Life. The same mechanics are at play when creditors run on a debtor’s assets: a
run is merely a scenario in which competing creditors race to successfully enforce claims against
a party possessing resources insufficient to satisfy all claims.
22. Id.
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006) (outlining the nondebtor derivative counterparty's right to
terminate contracts and seize collateral); id. §§ 555–56, 559–61 (specifying that counterparties
may exercise existing contractual rights, including ipso facto clauses, in different varieties of
derivative agreements). For a discussion of the Safe Harbor, see infra Part III.B.2.
24. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 3, 20, 131–32 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88,
89, 105–06, 191–92 (justifying the 2005 amendments as “provisions designed to reduce systemic
risk”); cf. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 40 (1999) (“The ability to terminate
financial contracts upon a counterparty's insolvency enhances market stability. Such close-out
netting limits losses to solvent counterparties and reduces systemic risk. It permits the solvent
parties to replace terminated contracts without incurring additional market risk and thereby
preserves liquidity.”).
25. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583–84
(“The prompt closing out or liquidation of [derivatives] freezes the status quo and minimizes the
potentially massive losses and chain reactions that could occur if the market were to move
sharply in the wrong direction.”); cf. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note
24, at 26 (“[The Safe Harbor provisions] serve to reduce the likelihood that the procedure for
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Harbor frees CDS counterparties to claim the debtor’s assets upon
26
filing for bankruptcy, however, there is a risk that a run on the
debtor will lead to a liquidity shortage “that has the potential to spill
over to other firms and markets and cause widespread instability in
27
financial markets.” Put simply, the Safe Harbor may merely
substitute one kind of systemic risk for another.
This Note argues that the Safe Harbor would more effectively
reduce systemic risk if it did not exempt all CDSs from bankruptcy
proceedings. The Safe Harbor’s blanket exemption presupposes that
the benefits of increased market liquidity when CDS counterparties
liquidate their contracts and seize collateral will outweigh the costs of
an unrestrained run on the debtor’s assets. That is true when CDSs
28
are practically fungible, but not all CDSs hold the same value for
both the debtor and creditor.
This Note posits that when CDSs are analogous to insurance
contracts, they likely have more value in the hands of the debtor than
in the hands of a counterparty. The argument is as follows: Insurancelike CDSs protect the debtor firm against a certain risk. Removing
this protection subjects the debtor to greater risk, further devaluing
29
the firm. If the decrease in the debtor firm’s value exceeds the value
created by liquidation of the CDS, the liquidation results in a net
30
loss. If these kinds of liquidations are widespread or the debtor firm
is sufficiently large, the operation of the Safe Harbor may have
31
negative systemic consequences. Thus, modifying the Safe Harbor to
F
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F

resolving a single insolvency will trigger other insolvencies due to the creditors’ inability to
control their market risk.”).
26. For a discussion of the dangers posed by a “run” on the debtor’s assets, see infra Part
IV.A.1.
27. Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code:
Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 105–06 (2005).
28. See id. at 95 (arguing that derivatives “are fungible assets and can be seized by creditors
without” undue negative consequences).
29. See id. at 115 (“[I]ncreased exposure to . . . risk can harm the firm’s operations and its
other creditors.”).
30. The values at play here can be conceptualized as follows: the decrease in the debtor’s
value caused by the counterparty’s termination of contracts and seizure of collateral can be
thought of as the difference between the firm’s liquidation value and the firm’s going-concern
value, plus the situation-specific losses arising from the termination of the debtor’s hedges. See
infra Part IV.B. Weighing against these losses is the liquidity value that a counterparty gains
when it terminates a contract with the debtor and is no longer locked into the contract
(rendering the counterparty safe from market fluctuations that would affect the contract’s
value). Additionally, the aggregate effect of these individual settlements is to ease market-wide
uncertainty as to the exposure of market participants to the debtor. See infra Part IV.C.
31. See infra notes 174–75, 183–89 and accompanying text.
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subject insurance-like CDSs to normal bankruptcy proceedings might,
on the whole, reduce the possibility that a firm entering bankruptcy
will pose a systemic threat.
This argument depends upon an understanding of how CDSs
raise systemic risk problems in the context of bankruptcy
proceedings. As such, this Note begins by discussing in Part I the most
salient features of CDSs and derivatives (the family of financial
instruments to which they belong). Part II explains the conceptual
underpinnings of systemic risk. Part III concludes the background
discussion with a closer look at the regulation of derivatives and their
treatment under the Bankruptcy Code.
The remainder of the Note identifies some crucial problems with
the Safe Harbor and proposes a reform. Part IV evaluates how the
Safe Harbor interacts with the dynamics of systemic risk by
examining two case studies: the collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management, a hedge fund, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,
a financial services firm. Finally, Part V outlines a reform that may
make the Safe Harbor a better tool for reducing systemic risk.
Without empirical evidence, it is impossible to know whether this
Note’s proposed reform would provide greater benefits than the
current blanket exemption; this Note simply seeks to outline the
dynamics at play in order to guide future inquiries into the matter.
I. DERIVATIVES, CREDIT DERIVATIVES,
AND CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS
Understanding how derivatives pose a danger to the financial
system requires understanding how these financial instruments are
used and why they are unique. The term “derivatives” generically
refers to a family of financial instruments linked together by certain
common traits. A basic understanding of these traits will help
illuminate the particular species of derivative that is the focus of this
Note—the CDS. Accordingly, this Part begins with a brief primer on
derivatives, before the discussion narrows to focus on credit
32
derivatives and the mechanics and uses of the CDS. This Part closes
with a brief look at how the widespread use of CDSs has changed the
way that the financial markets function, for better and for worse.
F

F

32. FRANK J. FABOZZI, HENRY A. DAVIS & MOORAD CHOUDHRY, INTRODUCTION TO
STRUCTURED FINANCE 45 (2006).
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A. Derivatives Generally
A derivative is a bilateral financial contract contemplating that
“either or both of two parties (each referred to as a ‘counterparty’)
agrees to make payments or deliveries to the other based on the
performance or change in the value” of an external instrument, rate,
33
or event (the “reference subject”). The reference subject is limited
only by the imaginations of the contracting parties: “anything that can
be quantified and objectively verified can be the subject of a
34
derivative.” For example, the most common types of derivative
securities are “financial contracts that ‘derive’ their value from cash
market instruments such as stocks, bonds, currencies and
35
commodities.” Derivative instruments commonly reference interest
36
rates, currency exchange rates, or physical commodities, but a
derivative may also reference such unusual subjects as weather
37
conditions and mortality rates.
The payout value of a derivative is derived from the change in
38
value of the reference subject. The most salient characteristic of a
derivative is that its value is a function of the reference subject’s
value. The relationship between the two values does not necessarily
correlate in a linear fashion; rather, it is defined by the terms of the
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

33. Mark A. Guinn & William L. Harvey, Taking OTC Derivative Contracts as Collateral,
57 BUS. LAW. 1127, 1128 (2002).
34. Id. at 1129.
35. SALIH N. NEFTCI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MATHEMATICS OF FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES 2 (2d ed. 2000) (citing Joseph S. Rizello, The Development and Evolution of
Derivative Products, in THE HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES & SYNTHETICS: INNOVATIONS,
TECHNOLOGIES AND STRATEGIES IN THE GLOBAL MARKETS 1, 2 (Robert A. Klein & Jess
Lederman eds., 1994)).
36. See Guinn & Harvey, supra note 33, at 1128–29 (describing typical reference subjects).
37. The Chicago Mercantile Exchange offers weather derivatives that derive their value
from average temperature fluctuation around a predetermined average temperature. See
GEOFFREY CONSIDINE, AQUILA ENERGY, INTRODUCTION TO WEATHER DERIVATIVES
(1999), http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/weather/files/WEA_intro_to_weather_der.pdf
(presenting a broad overview of weather derivatives). For a discussion of mortality derivatives,
which are designed to allow pension funds to hedge against the costs incurred when pensioners
live longer than expected, see GUY COUGHLAN ET AL., JPMORGAN, Q-FORWARDS:
DERIVATIVES FOR TRANSFERRING MORTALITY AND LONGEVITY RISK 1 (2007),
http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=JPM/DirectDoc&urlname=LM_Q_forwards.pdf.
38. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, FAQs: Financial Markets, http://www.treas.gov/
education/faq/markets/derivatives.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2009) (“A derivative is a financial
instrument whose price is derived from the value of one or more underlying assets, liabilities, or
indices.”).
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39

contract. By tying a set payout or exchange to changes in the state of
a reference subject, derivatives allow firms to plan for future risks.
Therefore, derivatives serve as “the basic building blocks of all more
40
complicated risk management positions.”
Derivatives have transformed finance over the last thirty years
by “fostering more precise ways of understanding, quantifying, and
41
managing risk.” In discussing risk management, former Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan explained that, because
derivatives “permit[] the unbundling of financial risks . . . . individual
financial instruments now can be analyzed in terms of their common
underlying risk factors, and risks can be managed on a portfolio
42
basis.” A well-designed derivatives transaction can isolate and shift
onto a willing derivative seller almost any imaginable risk. As the
financial services industry has recognized the versatility and
usefulness of these instruments, the derivatives market has grown
43
exponentially. Firms use derivatives not only to hedge against a wide
44
variety of risks, including fluctuations in interest and exchange rates,
45
but also as speculative investments and for arbitrage.
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

39. The customizability of derivative agreements contributes to their versatility, which is
desirable, and their complexity, which is not. In some cases, complexity can obscure the ultimate
value of an instrument, which may lead to nasty surprises. For a cogent and entertaining account
of how complexity can wreak havoc in financial markets, see generally RICHARD BOOKSTABER,
A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL
INNOVATION (2007).
40. ROBERT W. KOLB & JAMES A. OVERDAHL, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, at vii (3d ed.
2003).
41. Letter from Lawrence H. Summers, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Treasury, et al., to Al Gore,
President of the Senate, U.S. Senate (Nov. 9, 1999), in PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN.
MKTS., OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE
ACT 5, 5 (1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/otcact.pdf.
42. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago’s Forty-first Annual Conference on Bank Structure (May 5, 2005), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050505/default.htm.
43. A 2003 survey found that 92 percent of the world’s five hundred largest companies use
derivatives to hedge risk. Press Release, Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, Over 90% of the
World's 500 Largest Companies Use Derivatives to Help Manage Their Risks, According to
New ISDA Survey (Apr. 9, 2003), available at http://www.isda.org/statistics/surveynewsrelease
030903v2.html.
44. See Guinn & Harvey, supra note 33, at 1130–32 (describing various kinds of derivatives
transactions).
45. John T. Lynch, Comment, Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative Supplants Need for
Direct Regulatory Intervention—A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation?, 55 BUFF. L. REV.
1371, 1373 (2008). According to another source, “derivatives are unsurpassed as tools for
speculation.” KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note 40, at vii.
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Regardless of the instrument’s purpose, derivatives generally fall
into two broad categories: exchange-traded and over-the-counter
46
47
(OTC). This Note focuses on the largely unregulated OTC market,
which consists of parties directly entering into private contracts
48
without using a clearinghouse intermediary. In the OTC market, the
counterparties can negotiate the details of the contract directly and
enter into transactions tailored to their unique needs. Consequently,
there is a great amount of innovation and variation among OTC
transactions. Nevertheless, the OTC derivative market can be roughly
divided into five groups: “foreign currency exchange contracts,
interest rate contracts, equity-linked contracts, commodity contracts,
49
and credit derivatives.” Since the early 1990s, the credit derivative
50
market in particular has experienced explosive growth.
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

B. Credit Derivatives and Credit Default Swaps
Credit derivatives are generally defined as “financial instruments
whose payoffs are linked in some way to a change in credit quality of
51
an issuer or issuers.” A “change in credit quality” can be as
straightforward as a downgrade in credit rating or as dramatic as
52
53
bankruptcy. Credit quality reflects credit risk, which is generally
F

F

F

F

F

F

46. Lynch, supra note 45, at 1375.
47. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1036 (“Because swaps are structured as overthe-counter (OTC) derivatives, they are largely unregulated. Among other things, this means
that the details of particular swaps often go undisclosed.”).
48. Lynch, supra note 45, at 1375. In contrast to OTC instruments, exchange-traded
instruments are “traded on an organized financial exchange.” KOLB & OVERDAHL, supra note
40, at 4. In this market, the counterparties enter into standardized contracts with an exchange
clearinghouse (such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange or the Chicago Board of Trade),
Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1996), and the clearinghouse acts as the counterparty both to the buyer and the
seller, id. at 16.
49. Lynch, supra note 45, at 1376.
50. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1021 (“[T]he market for credit derivatives has
grown from virtually nothing a decade ago to the range of $20 trillion of notional value in
2006.”).
51. Id. at 1019.
52. See MOORAD CHOUDHRY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES 13 (2004)
(listing as typical credit events defaults on bond payments, credit rating downgrades,
restructuring, and bankruptcy).
53. “Credit risk is the oldest form of risk in the financial markets.” JOHN B. CAOUETTE,
EDWARD I. ALTMAN & PAUL NARAYANAN, MANAGING CREDIT RISK: THE NEXT GREAT
FINANCIAL CHALLENGE 1 (1998).
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54

thought of as the probability of default on an outstanding obligation.
Thus, credit derivatives allow parties to reduce the credit risk of an
investment or transaction by shifting some or all of the risk onto a
55
derivative seller.
56
The most common type of credit derivative is the CDS, a
private contract that transfers credit risk from a credit protection
57
buyer to a protection seller. A protection buyer can use a CDS to
unbundle and hedge the credit risks associated with a particular
58
entity, a group of entities, or even an entire industry. By using a
CDS in combination with other derivatives, a protection buyer may
customize a transaction or business relationship such that it has
59
“almost any desired risk profile.”
In a CDS transaction, the protection buyer makes either fixed
periodic payments or a single up-front payment to the protection
60
seller and, in return, the protection seller is obligated to make a
61
payment or swap upon the occurrence of a predefined credit event.
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

54. See Société Générale, Credit Risk, http://www.equityderivatives.com/what-the-expertssay/glossary/credit-risk/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2009) (defining credit risk as “the risk that a loss
will be incurred if a counterparty to a (derivatives) transaction does not fulfill its financial
obligations in a timely manner”); see also Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar.
Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing a particular type of credit risk
known as “country risk”).
55. See Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd., 375 F.3d at 171 (“Banks, investment funds and
other institutions increasingly use financial contracts known as ‘credit derivatives’ to mitigate
credit risk.”).
56. Id.
57. See id. at 171–72 (defining a CDS as “[a] contract which transfers credit risk from a
protection buyer to a credit protection seller” (alteration in original) (quoting OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BANK DERIVATIVES REPORT: FOURTH QUARTER
2003, at 5 (2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/deriv/dq403.pdf)).
58. Bruce Kayle, The Federal Income Tax Treatment of Credit Derivative Transactions, in
THE HANDBOOK OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES 221, 225 (Jack Clark Francis, Joyce A. Frost & J.
Gregg Whittaker eds., 1999)) (“A [CDS] can be written with respect to a single obligation, but
frequently will provide for a payment based on the default of any one or more obligations in an
identified portfolio of reference obligations.”). The reference subject may be a debt or equity
asset (or group of assets) or an entity (or group of entities). CHOUDHRY, supra note 52, at 16–
19. If the reference subject is an asset, the CDS would be concerned with the credit quality of
bonds or other securities. If the reference subject is an entity, the CDS would be concerned with
the credit of “[a] corporate or sovereign name.” Id. at 14 n.8.
59. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1024. For example, “[i]f the lender wishes to bear a
borrower’s firm specific default risk, but not risk related to the industry as a whole . . . the
lender could purchase derivatives that would compensate the lender in the event of an industry
downturn (such as a derivative linked to the stock prices of a broad group of companies in the
industry).” Id.
60. Kayle, supra note 58, at 224.
61. Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd., 375 F.3d at 172.

FAUBUS IN FINAL

12/15/2009 11:44:03 AM

812

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:801

The payment or swap takes place according to the terms articulated
in the contract: generally, the protection seller is obligated to pay the
62
buyer using a predefined settlement mechanism. The settlement
mechanism may call for either “cash settlement . . . or physical
delivery of the reference asset, in exchange for a cash payment equal
63
to the initial notional [i.e., face] amount [of the CDS contract].”
Typically, the protection seller’s payout equals “the difference
between the reference obligation’s original principal amount or fair
market value at the time the [CDS] is entered into and post-[credit
event] market value of the reference obligation,” but the
counterparties are free to specify any desired variety of payout in the
64
CDS contract. In essence, CDS counterparties wager on the
occurrence of a credit event, typically a “bankruptcy, default, or
65
restructuring,” and the CDS buyer transfers to the seller the risk
that the credit event will occur.
66
CDSs are used primarily for hedging or “trading to reduce risk”
by taking a position in one investment to offset the risk of another
67
investment position. A hedging strategy sacrifices some of the
potential return on the initial investment in exchange for limiting the
68
risk posed by the initial investment. Thus, a hedge will not increase
the return of an investment (it will, in fact, decrease the return), but it
69
does make a desired outcome more certain. A typical CDS
transaction illustrates this principle: a bank might hedge the credit
risk associated with a major loan by buying a CDS from a third party
with payout triggered by the borrower’s credit event. If the borrower
defaults on the loan, “the bank will lose money on the loan but make
money on the [CDS]; conversely, if the [borrower] does not default,
the bank will make a payment to the [protection seller], reducing its
70
profits on the loan.”
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

62. Id. at 172.
63. Id. at 173 (alterations in original) (quoting Joyce A. Frost, Credit Risk Management
from a Corporate Perspective, in THE HANDBOOK OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES, supra note 58, at
87, 90).
64. Kayle, supra note 58, at 224–25.
65. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1019.
66. See id. at 1023 (“[H]edging benefits[] [are] the most familiar virtue of credit default
swaps.”).
67. Romano, supra note 48, at 9.
68. Lynch, supra note 45, at 1374.
69. Romano, supra note 48, at 9.
70. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1019.
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As illustrated by the example above, a CDS used to hedge credit
71
risks is much like an ordinary insurance contract. Hedging CDSs are
often used as “insurance policies for holders of corporate bonds or
other securities against downgrades in the credit of the issuing
72
companies.” As with an insurance policy, the protection buyer pays
73
either an upfront or periodic fee, “like an insurance premium,” to
the protection seller in exchange for “a contingent payment if a
74
predefined credit event occurs.” The similarity between hedging
CDSs and insurance contracts plays a central role in this Note’s
75
argument regarding how CDSs should be regulated.
CDSs are also useful tools in arbitrage and speculative
76
investment. A speculative CDS investment (referred to as a “naked”
CDS) is essentially a bet on the occurrence of a specified credit
77
event. This is true because an investor may purchase a CDS
referencing specific risks or market segments “without having to
purchase outright the instruments or assets that make up that
78
market.” This distinguishes naked CDSs from insurance-like
hedging CDSs: when the specified credit event occurs in a naked CDS
transaction, the protection buyer will receive payment without regard
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

71. Merrill Lynch Int’l v. XL Capital Assurance Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y.
2008); see also CHOUDHRY, supra note 52, at 1 (noting that a CDS is “conceptually similar to an
insurance policy taken out against the default of a bond”); Kayle, supra note 58, at 224–25
(stating that a CDS “functions as a form of insurance against the risk of default” when the
protection buyer is exposed to the reference subject); cf. Ng, supra note 4 (describing CDSs as
“insurance against a Lehman default”). For a more detailed discussion of the similarities
between insurance contracts and CDSs, see infra notes 213–20 and accompanying text.
72. Deutsche Bank AG v. AMBAC Credit Prods., LLC, No. 04 Civ. 5594 (DLC), 2006 WL
1867497, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2006).
73. Merrill Lynch Int’l, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 300.
74. Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 172
(2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Frost, supra note 63, at 90).
75. See infra Part III.B.2.
76. See Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd., 375 F.3d at 172 (characterizing the protection
seller’s use of credit derivatives as a strategy to “earn income and diversify their own investment
portfolios” (footnote omitted)).
77. See Jerome A. Madden, A Weapon of Mass Destruction Strikes: Credit Default Swaps
Bring Down AIG and Lehman Brothers, BUS. L. BRIEF, Fall 2008, at 15, 21 n.9 (citing Terry
Kivlan, Senate Agricultural Panel Reviews Credit Default Swaps, CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 14,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 19567728)).
78. Lynch, supra note 45, at 1374.

FAUBUS IN FINAL

12/15/2009 11:44:03 AM

814

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:801

to whether they suffered an actual loss (that is, without an “insurable
79
interest” ).
F

F

C. CDSs and the Financial System
The ubiquitous use of CDSs by banks and other market
participants to hedge credit risk has changed the way that the credit
markets function and, according to some, has resulted in “system80
wide benefits.” Alan Greenspan argued that the widespread use of
CDSs mitigated the potentially devastating repercussions of the
“largest corporate defaults in history (WorldCom and Enron) and the
81
largest sovereign default in history (Argentina).” Many of the firms
that were exposed to risk posed by the defaults of these entities had
82
hedged that risk by purchasing CDSs. This use of CDSs to insure
against credit risk—if widespread—may contribute to a more resilient
economy that is less susceptible to system-wide shocks resulting from
83
the failure of a major market participant.
The widespread use of CDSs, however, also has the potential to
harm the economy. Putting aside issues relating to the substance of
individual contracts (for example, whether accurate information
84
about the reference subject exists), the increase in derivatives-based
hedging strategies may contribute to systemic risk by increasing the
85
“linkages among market participants.” In their capacity to create
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

79. The phrase “insurable interest” is defined as “[a] legal interest in another person’s life
or health or in the protection of property from injury, loss, destruction, or pecuniary damage.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 829 (8th ed. 2004).
80. See, e.g., Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1024 (describing the benefits of CDSs if
used widely by banks); id. at 1023–27 (discussing the beneficial consequences of credit
derivatives on the credit markets); id. at 1032–40 (describing the detrimental consequences of
credit derivatives).
81. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Corporate Governance, Remarks to the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 2003 Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (May
8, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030508/
default.htm.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1024 (citing the arguments of Alan
Greenspan and others that “credit derivatives served as a shock absorber during the corporate
crises of 2001 and 2002”).
84. This was one of the problems underlying AIG’s collapse. See Morgenson, supra note 5
(“Because the underlying debt securities . . . carried blue-chip ratings, [AIG] was happy to book
income in exchange for [selling CDSs]. After all, [AIG’s executives] apparently assumed, they
would never have to pay any claims.”).
85. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 221 (2008).
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86

linkages, CDSs are analogous to vectors for systemic risk: “If an
institution fails, it potentially would impact many more other
87
Thus, although CDSs
institutions” through these linkages.
strengthen financial markets by allowing market participants to
transfer credit risk to those (hopefully) better able to handle it, they
also tie market participants together in a fashion that makes it
difficult to contain market shocks. The relationship between CDSs
and systemic risk is explored in detail in Part II.
F

F

F

F

II. SYSTEMIC RISK
Systemic risk is generally defined as the risk that a “trigger
event” such as a market or institutional failure will cause a chain of
consequences negatively affecting both market participants and the
88
larger economy. In the worst case scenario, the consequences of a
systemic risk trigger event might encompass the failure of financial
institutions or entire markets. Less severely, a trigger event could
cause losses to financial institutions and volatility in financial markets.
In any case, the consequences affect financial institutions, markets, or
89
both.
Systemic risk differs from normal market risk, which is common
to an entire market and not unique to any individual market
90
participant. Market fluctuations relating to market risk are
inevitable and even desirable; they “facilitate[] market equilibrium
91
and curb[] excessive interest rates or periods of inflation.” In
contrast, systemic risk is the risk that market dynamics may cause an
otherwise ordinary problem to spread, harming other market
participants or, in the most dramatic scenario, causing an entire
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

86. In biology, a vector is defined as “[an] organism that transmits a pathogen[] . . . . [or]
any agent that acts as a carrier or transporter.” RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 2108 (2d ed. 2001).
87. Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 221.
88. Id. at 198.
89. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1–2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583,
583–84 (describing systemic risk as the risk that “the insolvency of one commodity or security
firm [may] spread[] to other firms and possibl[y] threaten[] the collapse of the affected
market”).
90. See Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 204 (“Although these downturns are sometimes
conflated with systemic risk, they are more appropriately labeled systematic risk, meaning risk
that cannot be diversified away and therefore affects most, if not all, market participants.”).
91. Id.
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market or the entire financial system to collapse. It is noteworthy that
92
even normal market fluctuations may trigger systemic problems.
The best-known illustration of a systemic risk scenario is the
1998 collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management
93
(LTCM). The Russian government defaulted on its bonds that year,
causing “LTCM to lose hundreds of millions of dollars and approach
94
a default.” Motivated by the fear of enormous losses to LTCM’s
counterparties and the failure of multiple credit and interest rate
95
markets, “the Federal Reserve proactively stepped in to broker a
96
settlement of LTCM’s debts.” Notably, the systemic risk posed by
LTCM’s near failure resulted from LTCM’s derivatives-based
97
hedging strategy; the derivatives used by LTCM provided the very
linkages through which the repercussions of its default would have
98
traveled. An LTCM default presumably would have harmed
counterparties to LTCM that were also linked to other institutions
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

92. Id. at 204 n.53 (citing Michael D. Bordo, Bruce Mizrach & Anna J. Schwartz, Real
Versus Pseudo-International Systemic Risk: Some Lessons from History 8–9 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5371, 1995), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=225434).
93. See Desmond Eppel, Note, Risky Business: Responding to OTC Derivative Crises, 40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 677, 677 (2000) (“[T]he Russian government declared a debt
moratorium and devalued the ruble on August 17, 1998 . . . .”).
94. Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 201.
95. Id. at 201 (“Had Long-Term Capital . . . default[ed], its [derivatives] counterparties
would have immediately ‘closed out’ their positions. If counterparties would have been able to
close-out their positions at existing market prices, losses, if any, would have been minimal.
However, if many firms had rushed to close-out hundreds of billions of dollars in transactions
simultaneously, they would have been unable to liquidate collateral or establish offsetting
positions at the previously-existing prices. Markets would have moved sharply and losses would
have been exaggerated . . . . [Moreover, as a result of these market moves,] there was a
likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate markets would . . . possibly cease to function
for a period of one or more days and maybe longer. This would have caused a vicious cycle: a
loss of investor confidence, leading to a rush out of private credits, leading to further widening
of credit spreads, leading to further liquidations of positions, and so on.” (third and fourth
alterations in original) (quoting Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Banking and Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 18–19 (1998) (statement of William J. McDonough,
President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.), available at http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/
speeches/1998/mcd981001.html). For further discussion of the dynamics of LTCM’s collapse, see
infra notes 183–89.
96. Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 201.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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99

and markets. Thus, LTCM’s default would have “adversely affected
100
many market participants with no [direct] connection to LTCM.”
The specter of these widespread consequences makes systemic
risk “the totem of choice for proponents of increased risk
101
regulation.” Ironically, “systemic failures are very rare events,
indeed so rare that one has never been observed in modern
102
economies.” Perhaps because the threat of systemic failure is more
103
the question of how best to regulate
theoretical than actual,
104
systemic risk is hotly debated. Before discussing approaches to
regulating systemic risk, it is worth examining why regulation is an
appropriate response to the problem.
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

A. Systemic Risk as a Tragedy of the Commons
Regulation is appropriate to control systemic risk because,
without regulation, individual market participants will take

99. Id. at 221 (“[D]iversifying risk through hedging increases linkages among market
participants, which . . . could . . . foster systemic risk. If an institution fails, it potentially would
impact many more other institutions.” (footnote omitted)).
100. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 100.
101. Eppel, supra note 93, at 689. Skepticism is warranted when systemic risk is invoked to
prompt government action. Financial commentator Barry Ritholtz described systemic risk as the
“buzzword du jour,” claiming that government interventions in the financial system in response
to systemic risk concerns “occur far more regularly than an honest definition of that phrase
would require. Indeed, systemic risk has become the rallying cry of those who patrol the
corridors of Washington, D.C., hats in hand, looking for a handout.” BARRY RITHOLTZ &
AARON TASK, BAILOUT NATION: HOW GREED AND EASY MONEY CORRUPTED WALL
STREET AND SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY 5 (2009).
102. Eppel, supra note 93, at 689 (quoting Jón Daníelsson, The Emperor Has No Clothes:
Limits to Risk Modelling 18 (London Sch. of Econ., Working Paper, 2001), available at http://
www.sedlabanki.is/uploads/files/Malstofa_050301-JD.pdf). Even so, institutional failures such as
LTCM and AIG were thought to be potential trigger events capable of causing systemic failure;
in both cases, the government intervened to forestall systemic failure.
103. But see infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
104. For example, recently, systemic failure concerns prompted a round of government
bailouts. Post hoc bailouts are criticized for increasing moral hazard in the markets, especially in
firms that are “too big to fail.” David Lawder, U.S. Bailout Program Increased Moral
Hazard: Watchdog, REUTERS, Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/ousivMolt/
idUSTRE59K0UQ20091021 (quoting OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: OCTOBER 21,
2009, at 3, available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/October2009_Quarterly_
Report_to_Congress.pdf); see also RITHOLTZ & TASK, supra note 101, at 5 (“Perhaps what the
government should be doing is acting to prevent systemic risk before it threatens to destabilize
the world’s economy, rather than merely cleaning up and bailing out afterward.”).
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insufficient measures to prevent systemic failure. The motivation of
market participants “is to protect themselves but not the system as a
whole. Every firm has an incentive to restrain its risk taking in order
to protect its capital . . . . No firm, however, has an incentive to limit
its risk taking in order to reduce the danger of contagion for other
106
Given this incentive structure, systemic risk can be
firms.”
conceptualized as a tragedy of the commons because “the benefits of
exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual market
participants, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the
resource, whereas the costs of exploitation . . . are distributed among
107
an even wider class of persons.” Protective measures taken by
108
individual market participants will combat aspects of systemic risk,
but self-imposed regulation, without more, will not address the full
range of problems posed by systemic risk.
Systemic failure would not only harm market participants but
would also result in externalities negatively affecting the larger
109
economy and society as a whole. The former president of the
Federal Reserve, Timothy Geithner (who became the Secretary of
the Treasury in 2009), voiced this concern in 2008 when he testified
before the Senate that
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

[t]he most important risk is systemic. . . . [Systemic risk] is not
theoretical risk, and it is not something that the market can solve on
its own. It carries the risk of significant damage to economic activity.
Absent a forceful policy response, the consequences would be lower
incomes for working families, higher borrowing costs for housing,
education, and the expenses of everyday life, lower value of
110
retirement savings, and rising unemployment.
F

105. See Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 205–06 (discussing systemic risk as a tragedy of the
commons); cf. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968)
(defining and describing the tragedy of the commons).
106. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 24, at 31.
107. Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 206.
108. See id. at 231–34 (discussing ways in which the market regulates itself with varying
degrees of success).
109. See id. at 207 (“Failure of the financial system can generate social costs in the form of
widespread poverty and unemployment, which in turn can destroy lives and foster crime. . . .
Protecting health and safety therefore should be additional goals of regulating systemic risk.”
(footnote omitted)).
110. Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial
Regulators: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 4
(2008) (statement of Timothy Geithner, President and CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.),
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/OpgStmtGeithner4308Testimony.pdf.
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Market participants would not be willing to internalize these
111
societal costs, and thus, in the absence of regulation, would exercise
an insufficient degree of care to prevent systemic failure.
F

F

B. Systemic Risk Regulation
Even before the events of 2008, “[g]overnments and
international organizations [were] calling for increased regulation of
112
systemic risk.” Although events in the last two decades have
113
intensified the call for increased regulation, controlling systemic
risk is not a new item on the legislative agenda.
Historical attempts to regulate systemic risk focused on the most
important source of capital and thus the natural target for regulation:
114
the banking system. But, given that firms increasingly have more
access to “capital-market funding without going through banks or
115
other intermediary institutions,” modern systemic risk models also
116
consider nonbank financial institutions and market failures. The
dynamics of systemic risk remain similar in both the banking system
model and the more diffuse modern model. In both models, trigger
events cause institutional failures, and the consequences travel
“through linkages in a chain of relationships,” leading to even more
117
institutional and market failures. In the banking system, “the
linkages are interbank borrowings and the interbank clearing system
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

111. Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 206.
112. Id. at 194. Professor Schwarcz lists several government and nongovernment entities
that displayed concern about the problem of systemic risk. Id. at 194–96.
113. The 1998 collapse of LTCM spurred a flurry of government activity concerned with
reducing systemic risk. See Rhett G. Campbell, Financial Markets Contracts and BAPCA, 79
AM. BANKR. L.J. 697, 698 (2005) (“The financial markets amendments found in [the 2005
amendment of the Bankruptcy Code] . . . can be traced back to the near failure of [LTCM].”);
Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 211 (“After the near failure of LTCM, several U.S. government
agencies have attempted to study how to mitigate systemic risk . . . .”).
114. See Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 198–211 (examining systemic risk in the context of
banks and other financial institutions and listing regulations imposed on the banking system
designed to control systemic risk, including federal insurance of bank deposits and mandatory
minimum capital requirements).
115. Id. at 248; see also id. at 200 (“Companies today are able to obtain most of their
financing through the capital markets without the use of intermediaries.”); Turmoil in U.S.
Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of Federal Financial Regulators, supra note 110, at
7 (“Over the past thirty years, we have moved from a bank-dominated financial system to a
system in which credit is increasingly extended, securitized and actively traded in a combination
of centralized and decentralized markets.”).
116. Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 213.
117. Id. at 201.
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118

for payments.”
In the modern systemic risk model, negative
consequences “spread through capital-market linkages, rather than
119
merely through banking relationships.”
In accordance with the modern conception of systemic risk, one
regulatory approach focuses on the linkages through which a trigger
event can affect the market. As noted in the discussion of the LTCM
120
crisis, derivatives contracts are one linkage through which the
repercussions of a firm’s failure may reach other market participants,
creating the possibility that an individual institution’s failure may
121
cause a systemic failure.
Even though it is understood that the use of derivatives can
exacerbate systemic risk, derivatives have historically enjoyed a light
regulatory regime (relative to securities and other financial
instruments). This lack of regulation has allowed derivatives markets
to prosper. In light of the growth that derivative markets have
experienced and their integral role in modern risk management,
Congress has chosen to address derivative regulation by deploying
what could charitably be described as indirect legislative solutions. Of
these solutions, this Note is primarily concerned with the series of
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that created the Safe Harbor
122
and thereby exempted derivatives from bankruptcy proceedings.
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

III. DERIVATIVES REGULATION
This Note focuses on the regulation of derivatives in the context
of bankruptcy proceedings. In an attempt to give an accurate
portrayal of the federal regulation of derivatives, this Part begins with
a brief discussion of the history of derivatives regulation and the
modern regulatory framework. The remainder of this Part discusses
several concerns unique to derivatives in the bankruptcy context and

118. Id.
119. Id. at 200.
120. See supra Part II.
121. See Eppel, supra note 93, at 689 (“Systemic risk is the risk most frequently associated
with derivatives in press reports and congressional testimony attempting to arouse public
concern about the dangers of these financial products.”).
122. The first of these amendments was passed in 1982 and the latest in 2005. See H.R. REP.
NO. 109-31(I) at 3, 20, 131–32 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89, 105–06, 190–91
(justifying the 2005 amendments as “provisions designed to reduce systemic risk”); H.R. REP.
NO. 97-420, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583–84 (listing as a goal minimizing
the “potentially massive losses and chain reactions that could occur if the market were to move
sharply in the wrong direction”).
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the de facto exemption of derivatives from normal bankruptcy
proceedings—one approach taken by Congress to address the
systemic risk problems posed by derivatives.
A. A Brief Sketch of Derivatives Regulation
The federal regulatory regime governing derivatives is the
product of a long and convoluted history that began as early as
123
124
1864. And although this history makes for an interesting read, it
says little about the body of federal law governing derivatives. It will
suffice to note that, after passing the Commodity Exchange Act of
125
1936 (CEA),
which provided for federal regulation of all
commodities and futures trading activities and required all futures
contracts to be traded on a “contract market” (such as the Chicago
126
Board of Trade), Congress acted in 1974 to cure uncertainties about
the legal status of newer forms of derivatives (which fell outside of
the categories of derivatives expressly covered by the CEA) with the
127
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act. This act created the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), an oversight
commission for the futures markets that is in some ways analogous to
128
the SEC.
A quarter of a century later, Congress passed the
129
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), which is
the source of most modern derivatives regulation.
Congress enacted the CFMA, among other reasons, “to promote
innovation for . . . derivatives and to reduce systemic risk by
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

123. The earliest attempts to regulate derivatives failed: the Anti-Gold Futures Act of 1864
was repealed by Congress two weeks after its enactment and the Future Trading Act of 1921
was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court only one year later in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S.
44 (1922). JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS
REGULATION 7, 13 (1987).
124. See generally MARKHAM, supra note 123 (examining the impact of regulation on the
development and growth of the commodity futures trading market). The modern regulatory
structure began with the Grain Futures Act of 1921 (GFA), which regulated grain futures
contracts traded on exchanges. See Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 43 (1923) (upholding the
validity of the GFA). The GFA was subsequently replaced by the Commodity Exchange Act of
1936 (CEA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27 (2006).
125. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27 (2006).
126. Id. § 6; MARKHAM, supra note 123, at 13.
127. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat.
1389; see also Lynch, supra note 45, at 1377 (describing the passage of the act).
128. Congress delegated power to both the SEC and the CFTC to regulate their respective
financial instruments. Lynch, supra note 45, at 1379.
129. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(5), 114
Stat. 2763, 2763A-365 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
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enhancing legal certainty in the markets for certain . . . derivatives
transactions[, and] to reduce systemic risk and provide greater
130
These
stability to markets during times of market disorder.”
principles indicate that Congress sought to create a regulatory
framework that addresses the dangers of systemic risk without stifling
the innovation in derivatives markets with excessive regulation.
The regulatory regime established by the CFMA treats OTC and
exchange-traded derivatives very differently. Whereas exchangetraded derivatives are generally subject to regulation under both the
CEA and the CFMA, OTC derivatives have enjoyed an almost
131
complete lack of regulation for as long as they have been used.
OTC derivatives owe their lack of regulation to the failure of early
regulatory efforts to anticipate the development of an OTC market
132
for derivatives. This lack of regulation allowed the OTC market to
develop—and flourish—with little government oversight, laying the
groundwork for the popular belief that the OTC derivatives market
133
flourished precisely because it lacked regulation.
This belief is well founded: the OTC derivatives market has
demonstrated that it has the capacity to address problems through
134
self-regulation and market initiatives. The self-sufficiency of the
OTC market helps to explain why it has historically escaped federal
regulation.
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

B. Derivatives in Bankruptcy Proceedings
Congress’s general reluctance to encumber the OTC derivatives
market is exemplified by the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of OTC
derivatives. Under the series of amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
135
that make up the Safe Harbor, OTC derivatives are generally
exempt from bankruptcy safeguards. Even after the debtor initiates
bankruptcy proceedings, the Safe Harbor allows the nondebtor
derivative counterparty to terminate derivatives contracts and seize
F

F

130. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
131. Jerry W. Markham, “Confederate Bonds,” “General Custer,” and the Regulation of
Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 2 n.6 (1994).
132. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
133. See Lynch, supra note 45, at 1380–83 (tying the explosion in OTC derivatives to a
general lack of regulation).
134. See generally id. (describing the OTC derivatives industry’s effort to self-regulate). For
a discussion of the market’s response to Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing, see infra
Part IV.C.
135. For a discussion of the Safe Harbor, see infra Part III.B.2.
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136

collateral from the debtor’s assets. No other financial instrument
137
receives such preferential treatment under the Bankruptcy Code.
The purpose of these favorable amendments, according to the
138
legislative history, is to regulate systemic risk. But understanding
how Congress intends this treatment to reduce systemic risk requires
understanding the basic mechanics of bankruptcy proceedings.
F

F

F

F

F

F

1. Bankruptcy Proceedings Generally.
Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which governs bankruptcy proceedings in which
139
the debtor plans to reorganize and continue its business,
“is
intended to permit the debtor to rehabilitate itself while
140
simultaneously protecting creditors.” The “central idea” of Chapter
141
11 reorganizations is to preserve going-concern surplus. Goingconcern surplus, which is “the value a firm has above and beyond the
142
liquidation value of its discrete assets,” only exists
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

if the firm’s assets are worth more to the firm than to outsiders. This
asymmetry arises when assets are customized to meet a firm’s
idiosyncratic needs or the needs of firms in the same industry . . . .
These specialized assets cannot be readily redeployed by other firms
(if the assets are firm specific) or by firms outside the industry (if
143
they are industry specific).
F

A bankruptcy filing creates an estate consisting of “all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
144
of the case,” and, more importantly, imposes an automatic stay on
145
creditors. The stay prohibits creditors from taking “any act to
obtain possession of property of the [bankruptcy] estate . . . or to
F

F

F

F

136. See supra note 23.
137. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 91.
138. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31 at 3, 20, 131–32 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89,
105–06, 190–91 (justifying the 2005 amendments as “provisions designed to reduce systemic
risk”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583–84 (invoking
systemic risk to justify the initial exemption for derivatives from automatic stay).
139. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–74 (2006).
140. In re PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc., 324 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2003).
141. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV.
751, 754 (2002). The preservation of going-concern surplus is central to Chapter 11 bankruptcy
law because it encourages ex ante investment in firms and maximizes creditor recovery ex post.
Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 108 n.69.
142. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 141, at 754.
143. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 111.
144. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006).
145. Id. § 362(a).
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146

exercise control over property of the estate.” Because it freezes the
debtor’s assets and thwarts otherwise valid claims to these assets, the
automatic stay is perhaps the most powerful effect of a bankruptcy
filing.
The bankruptcy estate includes both physical assets and the
147
debtor’s interest in executory contracts. Executory contracts are
agreements in which “the obligations of both the bankrupt and the
other party to the contract are ‘so far unperformed that failure of
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach
148
excusing the performance of the other.’”
Accordingly, the
automatic stay generally prohibits creditors from terminating
149
executory contracts for any reason. Additionally, the automatic stay
150
provision nullifies so-called ipso facto contractual clauses, or clauses
151
that “specif[y] the consequences of a party’s bankruptcy.” Typically,
an ipso facto clause specifies that a bankruptcy filing will result in an
152
automatic “default and a termination payment.”
The Bankruptcy Code also gives the debtor power, “subject to
the court’s approval, [to] assume or reject any executory contract”
153
impacted by the automatic stay. The purpose of this provision is to
help the financially distressed debtor maximize the value of its assets
by allowing it to assume beneficial contracts and reject unattractive
contracts. This practice, known as cherrypicking, is undesirable for
creditors holding executory contracts with the debtor but is crucial to
the rehabilitative function of Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

2. The Safe Harbor. Even though derivatives are typically
154
executory contracts, the Safe Harbor gives counterparties limited
F

F

146. Id. § 362(a)(3).
147. In re Carroll, 903 F.2d 1266, 1270–71 (9th Cir. 1990).
148. In re Gov’t Sec. Corp., 111 B.R. 1007, 1011 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (quoting Vern
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973)).
While the Bankruptcy Code does not define “executory contract,” the legislative history of
§ 365 states that an executory contract is a contract in which performance remains due on both
sides. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6303.
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (detailing comprehensive limits on a creditors’ ability to collect).
150. Id. § 365(e).
151. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (8th ed. 2004).
152. See, e.g., In re Mirant Corp., 440 F.3d 238, 240 (5th Cir. 2006).
153. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
154. Guinn & Harvey, supra note 33, at 1137; see also Debtor’s Motion Pursuant to Sections
105(a), 362 and 365 of the Bankr. Code to Compel Performance of Metavante Corp.’s
Obligations Under an Executory Contract and to Enforce the Automatic Stay at 7, In re
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 2009 WL 1569988 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009) (Trial
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power to enforce ipso facto clauses in certain derivatives contracts
155
Because ipso facto termination clauses are
(including CDSs).
standard provisions in derivatives contracts, the Safe Harbor
provisions effectively exempt derivatives contracts from the
automatic stay and, consequently, the possibility of cherrypicking.
The Safe Harbor is only available, however, “to the extent that
[counterparties] seek to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate their
156
contracts with the Debtors, or offset or net out their positions.”
The legislative history of the Safe Harbor indicates that this
special treatment of derivatives is aimed at reducing systemic risk by
157
maintaining liquidity in the market in the event of default. The Safe
Harbor maintains market liquidity because it permits counterparties
to terminate their contracts, unfreezing the previously illiquid assets
and freeing the counterparties to deploy the assets elsewhere in the
158
market. By allowing counterparties to terminate their relationship
with the debtor, the Safe Harbor “minimizes the potentially massive
losses [to counterparties] and chain reactions that could occur if the
159
market were to move sharply in the wrong direction.” Without the
Safe Harbor, when the debtor counterparty filed for bankruptcy the
automatic stay would freeze the contractual relationship between the
counterparties, leaving the nondebtor counterparty exposed to
market movements affecting the value of the contract.
The effects of the Safe Harbor are not completely salutary. For
example, the Safe Harbor opens the door to the threat that a run on
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) [hereinafter Debtor’s Motion] (arguing that “[t]he
[derivative contract at issue] is an executory contract because material performance—i.e.,
payment obligations—remains due by both [parties]”).
155. See supra note 23. The Safe Harbor has been described as “a narrow exception to the
general rule that ipso facto clauses are void.” Debtor’s Motion, supra note 154, at 11.
156. Debtor’s Motion, supra note 154, at 11 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 560). For example, when
faced with a counterparty that refused to pay money owed to the debtor under a swap
agreement, the debtor argued that “withholding performance . . . is not permitted under the
plain terms of the Safe Harbor Provisions.” Id.
157. COLLIERS BANKRUPTCY CODE: PART 1, at 904 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 2008) (explaining that the purpose of these provisions is to “ensure that nothing interferes
with the prompt liquidation of a debtor’s positions, due to the fear that the insolvency of one
party could trigger a chain reaction of insolvencies among others who carry accounts for that
party, which might compromise the integrity of the securities markets”).
158. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 24, at 40 (“The
ability to terminate financial contracts upon a counterparty’s insolvency . . . . permits the solvent
parties to replace terminated contracts without incurring additional market risk and thereby
preserves liquidity.”).
159. H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583–84.
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the debtor will cause an even greater liquidity shortage with “the
potential to spill over to other firms and markets,” leading to
160
In addition, the Safe Harbor gives
widespread instability.
counterparties the freedom to engage in opportunistic behavior that
can further destabilize the distressed firm and thereby increase the
risk of failure. Thus, the Safe Harbor gives rise to both costs and
benefits. The question, then, is whether the salutary effects of the
Safe Harbor outweigh its costs.
F

F

IV. EVALUATING THE SAFE HARBOR
This Note argues that the Safe Harbor likely produces costs in
excess of its benefits and thus does not optimally reduce systemic risk.
To be sure, the Safe Harbor combats systemic risk by facilitating
speedy settlement of derivatives contracts and thereby maintains
161
liquidity in troubled markets. But the Safe Harbor is also a source
of systemic risk because it allows derivatives counterparties to run on
the assets of a distressed firm. A run or “grab race” (this Note uses
the terms interchangeably) occurs when counterparties race to seize
collateral from the distressed firm’s assets; this can result in less
efficient distribution of those assets than would otherwise occur
under bankruptcy proceedings, or even in the event of the firm’s
failure. In both cases, the costs created by the run are borne by some
162
of the distressed firm’s creditors. These costs, in the aggregate, may
lead to systemic consequences that ultimately eclipse the benefit of
the liquidity provided by the Safe Harbor.
In order to illustrate the complex effects of the Safe Harbor, this
Part examines two case studies: the collapse of LTCM and the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (Lehman). The events that
transpired in the LTCM scenario demonstrate how the Safe Harbor
opens the door to an alternative type of systemic risk that arises when
F

F

F

F

160. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 105–06.
161. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 24, at 40 (“The ability
to terminate financial contracts upon a counterparty’s insolvency enhances market stability. . . .
[by] limit[ing] losses to solvent counterparties and . . . . permit[ting] the solvent parties to
replace terminated contracts without incurring additional market risk and thereby preserv[ing]
liquidity.”).
162. See Thomas H. Jackson, Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of
Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 399, 402 (1986) (“Creditors
will attempt to grab assets away from the debtor before others can reach them. This can make a
bad situation worse, for it can destroy any going-concern value that might otherwise exist if the
creditors would cooperate and leave the assets in place.”).
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counterparties run on a distressed firm’s assets. The events of the
Lehman bankruptcy demonstrate that even though the Safe Harbor
may lead to harmful behavior by a distressed firm’s counterparties, it
can help stabilize a troubled market. And although these two cases
ultimately provide equivocal evidence as to the effectiveness of the
Safe Harbor, they show that the Safe Harbor is in need of repair.
A. The Costs of the Safe Harbor: The Grab Race and
Opportunistic Behavior
The Safe Harbor creates costs by allowing counterparties to run
on a distressed firm’s assets and engage in opportunistic behavior that
may further harm the distressed firm. This Section looks at each cost
in turn.
1. The Grab Race. By allowing derivatives counterparties to
circumvent the automatic stay and exercise their claims against a
163
financially distressed firm, the Safe Harbor allows creditors to run
164
on a distressed firm in a grab race for the firm’s assets. The
mechanics of a run by CDS counterparties under the Safe Harbor are
as follows: a counterparty is free to invoke an ipso facto clause in a
CDS contract with a distressed firm (generally if that firm files for
bankruptcy). This extends to both protection buyers and sellers;
either party may terminate the contract and claim what it is owed. As
a general rule, however, the protection seller will have only a small
claim (or no claim at all) against the protection buyer’s assets. This is
true because the protection buyer pays as a premium either a single
165
upfront payment or a series of periodic payments. In contrast, the
protection seller’s potential liability under the contract is tied to the
performance of the reference subject. If, at the time of bankruptcy,
the distressed protection seller owes money to the protection buyer
166
(this is known as an “in the money” contract), the protection buyer
will invoke the ipso facto clause and terminate the contract;
subsequently, the protection buyer will act to secure its collateral. The
act of seizing collateral from the distressed protection seller’s
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

163. See supra note 136.
164. See supra note 162.
165. Kayle, supra note 58, at 224.
166. Stephen R. Kruft, Cross-Default Provisions in Financing and Derivatives Transactions,
113 BANKING L.J. 216, 231 n.24 (1996) (“In the typical derivative . . . a party may at any time be
‘in the money,’ meaning that it is entitled to a payment from its counterparty, or ‘out of the
money,’ meaning that it will be required to pay its counterparty.”).
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remaining assets is rational from an individual protection buyer’s
perspective, but when multiple protection buyers each act to secure
their portion of the protection seller’s limited resources, the resulting
grab race can lead to an inefficient distribution of the protection
167
seller’s remaining assets, draining the firm’s value.
The grab race occurs exactly like it sounds: creditors race to be
168
the first to grab assets to satisfy their claims on the distressed firm.
The race analogy is apt; the assets of a financially distressed firm are
“analogous to a scarce resource (e.g., fish in a lake) to which users
169
have unlimited, nonexclusive rights of access.” Without “regulation
or the creation of exclusive property rights,” users will quickly
170
deplete the resource. The first users “to exploit the resource will be
satisfied, the last will not; therefore, every user rushes to consume the
resource first. This will be true even if the resource would have more
171
value per user if exploited in a more restrained fashion.”
Bankruptcy law imposes the automatic stay to avoid a grab race,
allowing bankruptcy courts to distribute the resources of the debtor
firm in a restrained fashion that preserves the debtor’s going-concern
172
surplus value. The traditional view of the automatic stay is that its
purpose is to maximize the value of the debtor firm for reorganization
or sale to satisfy all creditors by “shielding the debtor’s assets and
preventing a race that rewards the first creditor to the
courthouse[] . . . and facilitat[ing] a collective proceeding in which the
parties (debtor and creditors) can negotiate the terms under which
173
the firm will continue.” In other words, the automatic stay restrains
creditors not only to preserve the resources of the debtor firm but
also to ensure that resources are distributed to creditors in an
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

167. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a
Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763, 781 (2004) (stating that a
grab race can “destroy value by, for instance, forcing the piecemeal liquidation of assets that
would be worth more as a going concern”).
168. Id. at 781 (“[C]reditors may try to sidestep the collective proceeding, and engage in a
‘race to the courthouse’ . . . to get their money back before anyone else gets paid.”).
169. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 106 (citing THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC
AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10–13 (1986)).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 167, at 781 (“U.S. bankruptcy law addresses the ‘grab
race’ concern by providing for an ‘automatic stay’ of creditors’ collection activities.”).
173. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 95.
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174

efficient and equitable fashion. In this way, bankruptcy law avoids
the unnecessary costs that a grab race would otherwise impose on
both the debtor and slower creditors.
In the absence of bankruptcy protections, the grab race can have
a powerful destabilizing effect on the debtor firm by “destroy[ing] any
going-concern value that might otherwise exist if the creditors would
175
cooperate and leave the assets in place.” Moreover, the distressed
firm’s slower creditors will be unable to satisfy their claims and
thereby will be harmed by the grab race.
The grab race does, however, have at least one positive aspect: it
allows for a speedy distribution of the debtor’s assets. Bankruptcy
proceedings take time, and for the duration of the proceedings the
ultimate values of the claims of many creditors may be uncertain.
Thus, without regard for whether their claims are ultimately fulfilled,
creditors benefit from an increase in the speed of the settlement of
their claims against the debtor. Markets also benefit when creditors
resolve uncertainties regarding their exposure to market movements
or distressed firms. These positive values—speed and certainty—must
be weighed against the costs of the grab race in order to clarify
whether the ultimate value of the Safe Harbor is positive or negative.
F

F

F

F

2. Opportunistic Behavior. By exempting derivatives from the
automatic stay, the Safe Harbor amplifies the power asymmetry
inherent in bankruptcy proceedings. One way in which the automatic
stay maximizes the financially distressed debtor’s rehabilitative
chances is by placing it in a position to bargain with its creditors. But
when the stay does not apply, the debtor has little bargaining power
and creditors are free to act opportunistically. Take a typical CDS
transaction as an example: a counterparty is free to invoke an ipso
facto clause and terminate a contract upon bankruptcy, and assuming
that the contract is in-the-money (or very nearly so), a protection
seller is more likely to terminate if the price of the contract has gone
176
up. In the case of a CDS contract, price would increase along with
an increased risk of default on the part of the reference entity. For
example, if a CDS references the bonds of an issuer whose credit
F

F

174. Under U.S. bankruptcy law, the claims of creditors may have different priorities
depending on the substance of their claims against the debtor. Generally speaking, the claims of
secured creditors have priority over unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II)
(2006). The claims of unsecured creditors are prioritized in accordance with the nine-level
hierarchy established in Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 507.
175. Jackson, supra note 162, at 402.
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rating is downgraded, then the price of the CDS will increase. In
such a case, if the protection seller terminates the derivative contract,
the debtor will be exposed to a more risky reference subject and it
will be more expensive for the debtor to secure a replacement
178
hedge.
Moreover, if there is a downside to the derivative contract, it is
179
assured to go to the debtor. To illustrate, assume that the debtor
has purchased a CDS protecting it against a credit downgrade of one
or more of several auto manufacturers that are its major clients. If, at
the time of bankruptcy, one or more of the auto manufacturers is at
an increased risk of default (relative to when the CDS was issued),
then the CDS is a valuable asset. In this scenario, the nondebtor
protection seller will terminate either because it no longer wishes to
sell protection on the auto manufacturer given its increased risk of
default or because it wishes to reissue the contract to another party at
a higher price. If at the time of bankruptcy, however, the auto
manufacturers are not at an increased risk of default, then the
180
protection seller will likely not terminate the CDS, but (possibly)
181
retains the option to do so unilaterally. Thus, the Safe Harbor shifts
182
costs onto distressed firms, costs that could potentially increase the
likelihood of failure. And if the firm is large enough, such failure may
have systemic risk implications.
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

176. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1050 (explaining that counterparties may have
an incentive to terminate a derivative strategically).
177. See id. (explaining that a CDS is more valuable when “the likelihood of issuer default
or downgrade has increased”).
178. Id.
179. See Shmuel Vasser, Derivatives in Bankruptcy, 60 BUS. LAW. 1507, 1542 (2005)
(“[O]nly the non-debtor counterparty obtains the upside of a derivative in a bankruptcy, not the
debtor.”).
180. This illustration is cobbled together from hypotheticals in Partnoy & Skeel, supra note
10, at 1050, and Vasser, supra note 179, at 1542.
181. It is unclear how long the nondebtor may wait without taking action under the Safe
Harbor before the nondebtor’s right to terminate the contract is waived. In In re Lehman Bros.
Holdings Inc., Nos. 08-13555 (JMP) and 08-13900 (JMP), 2009 WL 3088795 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 25, 2009), the debtor argued for the court to invalidate a provision in the standard contract
governing derivative agreements permitting the nondefaulting party to suspend payment
otherwise owed under the contract while an event of default was ongoing. Debtor’s Motion,
supra note 154, at 6, 10–11. The debtor argued that a counterparty who refuses to make
payments under their contract and does not attempt to “liquidate, terminate, or accelerate their
contract” in accordance with the Safe Harbor is “withholding performance[, which] . . . is not
permitted under the plain terms of the Safe Harbor Provisions.” Id. at 11
182. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1050 (“[Strategic] terminat[ion] mak[es] it much
more expensive for the debtor to enter a new hedging contract.”).
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B. Revisiting LTCM: When the Safe Harbor Hurts
More Than It Helps
The possible systemic consequences of a run on a distressed firm
under the Safe Harbor are best illustrated by the facts surrounding
183
the near failure of LTCM. When it became apparent that LTCM
was on the brink of filing for bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York intervened to bail out the distressed hedge fund. The
president of the Federal Reserve, William McDonough, explained
that the action was necessary because the “abrupt and disorderly
closeout of [LTCM]’s positions would pose unacceptable risks to the
184
American economy.” McDonough elaborated that this scenario
presented the “likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate
markets would experience extreme price moves and probably cease
to function . . . . This would have caused a vicious cycle. A loss of
investor confidence . . . leading to further liquidation of positions, and
185
so on.” Essentially, McDonough described the possibility of a
systemic failure resulting from the rush of LTCM’s counterparties to
simultaneously liquidate “hundreds of billions of dollars of
186
derivatives contracts.”
The Federal Reserve intervened to avoid the probable systemic
consequences of counterparties terminating derivatives contracts
187
under the Safe Harbor and seizing collateral from LTCM’s assets.
Had the Federal Reserve not intervened, and had LTCM filed for
bankruptcy, the resulting run on LTCM’s assets would likely have
had systemic consequences “adversely affect[ing] many market
188
participants with no connection to LTCM.” Those creditors who
arrived first would have received collateral, quickly depleting the
assets of the firm and leaving nothing for latecomers. This, in turn,
would have rendered other creditors unable to meet their own
obligations. In addition, the confusion of multiple counterparties
simultaneously terminating their outstanding derivatives contracts
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

183. See Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 201 (endorsing the view that the rush of counterparties
to close out derivatives contracts would have had systemic consequences). But see Edwards &
Morrison, supra note 27, at 103–06 (rationalizing the role of the Safe Harbor provisions in the
LTCM crisis by invoking their lack of a role in the Enron failure, which posed no systemic
threat despite similar circumstances).
184. Hedge Fund Operations, supra note 95, at 19.
185. Id.
186. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 100.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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with LTCM would have further reduced trading in the affected
markets. The rush of counterparties closing out derivatives contracts
with LTCM “would have resulted in tremendous uncertainty about
how far prices might move,” and most market participants would be
189
unwilling to trade in such volatile conditions.
F

C. Lehman Brothers: The Safe Harbor Doing Its Job
The outcome of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy illustrates that
the Safe Harbor helps to calm troubled markets despite having the
potential to harm the distressed firm. On the one hand, the Safe
Harbor enabled the OTC derivatives market to respond swiftly and
effectively to Lehman’s bankruptcy with a series of initiatives that
190
resolved much of the uncertainty in the $57.3 trillion CDS market.
On the other hand, the Safe Harbor enabled counterparties with
Lehman to engage in opportunistic behavior that harmed the firm
and its creditors. On the whole, however, it appears that in Lehman’s
case the Safe Harbor did more good than harm.
As of this Note’s publication, Lehman’s bankruptcy filing is the
191
biggest in history. This event left financial markets across the globe
“in cryogenesis” as market participants struggled to sort out the
192
uncertainties caused by Lehman’s filing. This was no small task in
the CDS market, in which Lehman played a “central role” as both a
193
counterparty and a reference entity. Lehman’s bankruptcy triggered
ipso facto clauses in “CDS contracts referencing Lehman,
and . . . terminate[d] the contracts that the firm had entered into as a
194
counterparty.” To complicate matters, there was no reliable public
information about the “volume of CDS contracts referencing Lehman
or the net amounts required to settle them . . . . The absence of such
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

189. Id.
190. Ingo Fender, Allen Frankel & Jacob Gyntelberg, Box 1: Three Market Implications of
the Lehman Bankruptcy, in Ingo Fender & Jacob Gyntelberg, Overview: Global Financial Crisis
Spurs Unprecedented Policy Actions, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2008, at 6, 6, available at http://www.bis.
org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0812x.htm.
191. Jonathan D. Glater & Gretchen Morgenson, Firm’s Creditors, Large and Small,
Compete for a Piece of What’s Left, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at C8 (“Lehman lists total assets
of $639 billion—more than the gross domestic product of Argentina and roughly 10 times the
size of Enron when it filed for bankruptcy in 2001.”).
192. Bo Peng, Lehman CDS Net Settlement Only $6B: What Does It Mean?, SEEKING
ALPHA, Oct. 13, 2008, http://seekingalpha.com/article/99654-lehman-cds-net-settlement-only6b-what-does-it-mean.
193. Fender et al., supra note 190, at 6.
194. Id.
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information created great uncertainty about the capacity of already
strained money markets to accommodate the anticipated
195
corresponding liquidity needs.”
Leaders in the OTC derivatives market joined together to repair
196
the damage wrought by Lehman’s bankruptcy. The result of their
efforts was a net settlement payment of $5.2 billion from sellers of
197
CDS protection on Lehman to their counterparties. The exchange
of this relatively small sum had “no noticeable impact on liquidity
198
conditions at the time of settlement,” but the settlement did ease
some of the uncertainties that likely contributed to the volatility of
199
capital markets following the bankruptcy filing.
Even as the Safe Harbor provided the means for market
participants to mend the OTC market, it also gave some
counterparties the means to evade their liabilities to Lehman. In
accordance with the Safe Harbor, counterparties to which Lehman
owed
money
were
“terminating
their
contracts
with
Lehman . . . . [and] trying to close [their derivatives] positions and
200
come up with [settlement] values.”
But as predicted,
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

F

195. Id.
196. First, an “extraordinary trading session” was organized just before the bankruptcy
filing to help major derivatives dealers net counterparty positions involving Lehman and
“enter[] into transactions with other participants that . . . fully or partially offset OTC
derivatives positions that they have with Lehman.” Press Release, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives
Ass’n, Lehman Risk Reduction Trading Session and Protocol Agreement (Sept. 14, 2008),
available at http://www.isda.org/press/press091408lehman.html. Second, an auction was
conducted among CDS dealers to determine the price of Lehman’s bonds, which established the
amount that CDS sellers would have to pay their counterparties. Mary Williams Walsh,
Insurance on Lehman Debt Is the Industry’s Next Test, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at B1. Finally,
the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, which provides clearance, settlement, and
information services for over-the-counter derivatives, closed out $72 billion in CDS contracts
referencing Lehman. Press Release, Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., DTCC Successfully
Closes Out Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy (Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://www.dtcc.com/
news/press/releases/2008/dtcc_closes_lehman_cds.php.
197. Press Release, Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., supra note 196.
198. Fender et al., supra note 190, at 7.
199. Id. Still, the settlement left banks and other credit providers uncertain about the
potential liabilities of trading partners: “Banks know how much they’re liable for. But they
don’t know how much others are [liable for], including their hedge fund clients.” Peng, supra
note 192.
200. Glater & Morgenson, supra note 191 (quoting Robert G. Pickel, CEO, Int’l Swaps &
Derivatives Ass’n). About 85 percent of Lehman’s trading partners terminated their derivatives
contracts, and “roughly 800 counterparties, mostly small players facing hefty terminations fees,
opted to leave about 6,000 Lehman trades outstanding.” Serena Ng & Mike Spector, The
Specter of Lehman Shadows Trade Partners: Derivatives Pacts Remain in Limbo for
Municipalities, Firms, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2009, at C1.
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contemporaneous with Lehman’s bankruptcy, some counterparties
owing money to Lehman tried “to slip away into the night [because i]t
is a waste of precious time for the bankruptcy trustee to have to chase
201
people down.” Some of Lehman’s clients “stopped paying when
Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection, prompting a series of
202
lawsuits from Lehman’s estate.” As of this Note’s publication,
Lehman has only been able to recoup from its derivatives
203
counterparties “$6 billion . . . out of a targeted $12 billion.” This
money recovered from Lehman’s derivatives business is used to pay
204
out on its creditors’ claims.
These two cases highlight the central conflict in using the Safe
Harbor to regulate systemic risk. On the one hand, as exemplified by
the Federal Reserve’s rationale for bailing out LTCM, there is a risk
that the unrestrained liquidation of derivatives contracts held by a
large financial institution can lead to “another form of systemic risk,
namely the risk that a ‘run’ by derivatives counterparties on the
205
debtor will itself destabilize financial markets.” On the other hand,
Lehman’s bankruptcy showed that market participants can work
together under the Safe Harbor to resolve uncertainties and stabilize
the market. Nevertheless, Lehman’s lesson is ultimately equivocal as
206
the settlement did little to enhance liquidity in the market.
There are at least two complicating factors that dilute the lessons
of these two cases. First, Lehman filed for bankruptcy whereas LTCM
did not; the systemic dangers posed by LTCM’s bankruptcy were
preempted by the Federal Reserve’s intervention. And second,
because Lehman was a financial enterprise with assets consisting
almost entirely of financial contracts, it was not a typical candidate for
207
Chapter 11 reorganization. This means that the Lehman bankruptcy
F

F

F
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F
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F

F

201. Glater & Morgenson, supra note 191 (quoting David A. Skeel, Jr., Law Professor,
University of Pennsylvania). According to the head of Lehman’s derivatives legal team, the
process of reconciling the derivatives is “unbelievably time-consuming.” Ng & Spector, supra
note 201 (quoting Locke McMurray, head of Lehman’s derivatives legal team).
202. Ng & Spector, supra note 200. One of these cases, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., is
discussed supra at note 181.
203. Ng & Spector, supra note 201.
204. Id.
205. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 94.
206. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 24, at 40 (describing the
liquidity benefits of the Safe Harbor provision).
207. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 114 (“The assets of [financial enterprises]
consist almost entirely of financial contracts. Although much talent and energy may have been
spent to assemble and manage its contracts, there is little or no going-concern surplus in an
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was less concerned with rehabilitation than with the orderly
liquidation of the firm’s assets. The negative effects of the Safe
Harbor should be less apparent in this type of case because there is
no rehabilitation effort for it to hinder. Any run on Lehman’s assets
would have been unlikely to result in serious costs that could have
been avoided through bankruptcy proceedings because, as a firm
possessing primarily financial assets, Lehman had little going-concern
208
surplus to preserve.
Even though the evidence is murky, the Lehman case indicates
that there is a danger that the Safe Harbor may not work as Congress
intended. The liquidity benefits produced by the Safe Harbor may be
outweighed by the corresponding losses caused by opportunistic
behavior and, if the firm has going-concern surplus to preserve, the
costs of the grab race. This is especially true when dealing with
derivatives that are more valuable to the debtor than to the
counterparty, because the liquidation of these derivatives will result
in a net loss. The aggregate effect of these losses is a greater
likelihood of debtor failure and the concomitant systemic
consequences. Because the purpose of the Safe Harbor is to reduce
systemic risk, there is little reason why it should apply to such
derivatives.
F

V. NARROWING THE SAFE HARBOR
The Safe Harbor would better reduce systemic risk if it did not
apply to CDSs used to hedge against a risk to the firm’s assets or
209
investments. In the rehabilitative context of Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
the following maxim answers the question of whether the automatic
stay should apply to a particular asset: “if the asset is worth more in
the hands of the debtor than it would be in the hands of a third party,
210
the stay should not be lifted.” Hedging CDSs—like insurance
211
contracts—are likely worth more in the debtor’s hands. They
F

F

F

F

F

F

insolvent [financial enterprise]. If a [financial enterprise] is insolvent, it is because the value of
its portfolio has diminished . . . .”).
208. Id.
209. For a discussion of hedging CDSs, see supra notes 66–75 and accompanying text.
210. JACKSON, supra note 169, at 183.
211. See Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Sportservice, Inc. (In re Cahokia Downs, Inc.), 5 B.R. 529,
530 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1980) (“[M]aintenance of insurance . . . is essential for the rehabilitation of
the debtor and the protection of the creditors.”). On the other hand, the Safe Harbor should
still apply to “naked” CDSs. In a naked CDS, the CDS holder has not purchased the CDS to
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protect against risks to assets and investments, and, if the CDS is
terminated, the debtor will most likely have to pay a premium to
replace the hedge (if a replacement can be found at all). These costs
of allowing CDSs to be terminated under the Safe Harbor increase
the probability of debtor failure, and firm failure is a classic systemic
212
risk trigger event. It follows that the inclusion of hedging CDSs
within the Safe Harbor may undermine its ultimate goal of reducing
systemic risk.
F

F

A. The Case for Narrowing the Safe Harbor
1. Hedging CDSs Are Analogous to Insurance Contracts. In
terms of economic substance, CDSs used to hedge a risk are very
213
similar to insurance contracts. Purchasers enter into a hedging CDS
to “insure” an interest in an investment or asset against the risk that a
change in the credit quality of the reference subject will damage that
214
215
interest.
The analogy to insurance is not perfect,
but the
differences between the two types of contract are largely immaterial.
CDSs, when used to hedge against the possibility of default, “have
216
payouts that are economically similar to insurance contracts.”
Insurance contracts, as assets of the bankruptcy estate, are
subject to the automatic stay, so insurers are forbidden from
terminating an insurance policy when the policyholder files for
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

protect against a risk to investments or assets, so the CDS is merely a bet on the default of the
reference entity. For a discussion of naked CDSs, see supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
212. For a discussion of systemic risk trigger events, see supra notes 88–89 and
accompanying text.
213. See Merrill Lynch Int’l v. XL Capital Assurance Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“A credit default swap is an arrangement similar to an insurance contract.”);
Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1050 (describing the similarities and differences between
CDSs and normal insurance policies).
214. For example, most hedging CDSs protect a stream of income (from a bond or other
security) against the possibility that the obligor will default or otherwise be unable to meet its
obligations.
215. For a detailed discussion of the differences between CDSs and standard insurance
policies, see Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 405, 423–24 (2007). Professor Lubben discusses, among other subjects, how the differences
between CDSs and standard insurance contracts affect the incentive to monitor counterparties
and implicate moral hazard issues. Id. at 423–30.
216. Id. at 423; see also CHOUDHRY, supra note 52, at 1 (noting that a CDS is “conceptually
similar to an insurance policy taken out against the default of a bond”); Kayle, supra note 58, at
224–25 (stating that a CDS “functions as a form of insurance against the risk of default” when
the protection buyer is exposed to the reference subject).
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217

bankruptcy. At the policy level, the automatic stay applies to
insurance contracts because the “maintenance of insurance . . . is
essential for the rehabilitation of the debtor and the protection of the
218
creditors.”
In other words, allowing the debtor to maintain
insurance is crucial because those contracts help further the
219
rehabilitative goals of Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
The strength of the analogy between insurance contracts and
hedging CDSs buttresses the argument for similar treatment of both.
As with insurance contracts, a hedging CDS may be crucial to the
220
debtor firm’s value. It follows that the termination of an insurancelike CDS may hinder the rehabilitation of the debtor and thereby run
counter to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

2. Termination of a Hedging CDS Exposes the Debtor to Greater
Risk. Debtors enter into hedging CDSs to hedge particular risks, and
221
this hedge disappears when a counterparty liquidates the contract.
Increased risk exposure can potentially destabilize the firm,
222
increasing the risk of firm failure. And even if it does not lead to
223
failure, increased risk lowers the value of the debtor firm. In both
cases, the effects of terminating a hedge extend beyond the debtor to
224
other creditors.
Even though the termination of a CDS diminishes the debtor’s
value, Professors Franklin R. Edwards and Edward R. Morrison
argue that the Safe Harbor rightly exempts derivatives from
bankruptcy proceedings because the termination of a derivative
F

F

F

F

F

F

F

217. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1050. The policy is generally treated as property of
the estate, so its termination would violate the automatic stay. See Holland Am. Ins. Co. v.
Sportservice, Inc. (In re Cahokia Downs, Inc.), 5 B.R. 529, 531 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1980) (holding
that an insurance policy “constitute[s] an asset of the bankrupt estate” and is therefore subject
to the automatic stay).
218. In re Cahokia Downs, Inc., 5 B.R. at 530.
219. Protecting a firm’s going-concern surplus is the central aim of Chapter 11
reorganization. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 141, at 758.
220. See, e.g., Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1049–50 (expressing skepticism about the
Safe Harbor’s presupposition that the termination of a derivative is a “no harm, no foul”
scenario); Vasser, supra note 179, at 1542 (expressing similar skepticism).
221. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 115.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id. (explaining that removing a hedge may harm both the debtor and its creditors
because “a firm in bankruptcy . . . will be unable to replace a derivative contract on precisely the
same terms” and the new high premium may cause the firm to decrease in value, damaging the
firm’s creditors).
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contract is unlikely to diminish the debtor’s going-concern surplus.
Going-concern surplus is the value that Chapter 11 “reorganization
226
exists to preserve.” Without diminution in this value, then, there is
227
no harm in allowing counterparties to avoid the automatic stay.
Whereas this argument may be true for financial firms, which
generally lack going-concern surplus because their assets primarily
228
consist of fungible financial contracts, it is not true for “nonfinancial firms, such as manufacturing, energy supply, and
229
For these firms, increased risk
telecommunications concerns.”
exposure may indeed “reduc[e] the value of [the firm’s] non-financial
assets . . . . [which] can harm the firm’s operations and its other
230
creditors.”
Even so, Professors Edwards and Morrison contend that the Safe
Harbor rightly ignores the costs of termination because the costs
imposed on the debtor (and by extension, on the other creditors) are
“no different from the effect of an economy-wide increase in demand
for a critical input (say, oil). Assuming a stable supply, the increase in
demand will raise the price of fuel, thereby increasing debtor’s costs,
reducing profits, and reducing (at least temporarily) firm value.” This
argument posits that, just as the Bankruptcy Code is unconcerned
with losses caused by macroeconomic events such as increases in
demand, it should not be concerned with the negative effect of a
counterparty’s decision to cancel a contract because, in both cases,
“the debtor firm [is merely exposed] to the desirable discipline of
231
market-based prices.”
Although this argument is persuasive, it ultimately fails because
it conflates macroeconomic events with actions that fall squarely
within the purview of the Bankruptcy Code. The potentially harmful
termination of contracts with a debtor is exactly the kind of behavior
232
that bankruptcy law regulates. The purpose of Chapter 11 is to
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225. Id. at 114.
226. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 141, at 758.
227. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 116.
228. Id. at 114.
229. Id. at 115.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. For example, the automatic stay prohibits creditors from “any act to obtain possession
of property of the [bankruptcy] estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over
property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2006).
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233

balance the interests of the debtor and its creditors, and it is
234
generally concerned with regulating creditor-debtor relationships.
Moreover, because Congress has chosen to combat systemic risk
through the Bankruptcy Code, the Code is explicitly concerned with
regulating events in the bankruptcy context that may contribute to
235
systemic risk. If this kind of termination does in fact increase the
systemic consequences of bankruptcy, it falls within the Code’s
regulatory purview.
F

F

F

F

F

F

3. Hedging CDSs Are Not Practically Fungible. When a
counterparty unilaterally chooses to terminate an insurance-like CDS,
diminishing the debtor’s value, it leaves fewer assets to satisfy other
236
creditors. In a sense, the terminating counterparty “imposes an
237
externality on other creditors.” When a derivative contract is
fungible, however, the opportunistic termination of that contract does
not lead to an overall loss. In this case, “the harm to the debtor firm is
generally equal to the counterparty’s gain: . . . the [debtor] loses a
238
hedge . . . and the counterparty ceases providing this hedge.”
Furthermore, when derivatives contracts are “fungible, replaceable
assets much like cash,” their termination will not affect the going239
concern surplus value of the debtor. In this scenario, termination
240
does not undermine the rehabilitative function of Chapter 11.
But, in practice, a debtor’s hedging derivatives will rarely be
fungible, if only because “[n]ew counterparties will charge a premium
241
to deal with a distressed firm.” The debtor will incur increased costs
242
to replace the hedge simply because it is in bankruptcy. Thus, in
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F

233. See, e.g., In re PPI Enterps. (U.S.) Inc., 324 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Chapter 11
[bankruptcy] is intended to permit the debtor to rehabilitate itself while simultaneously
protecting creditors.”).
234. 11 U.S.C. § 105 grants bankruptcy courts “broad authority to modify creditor-debtor
relationships.” United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990).
235. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 109-31(I), at 132 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 192
(justifying the Safe Harbor as “consistent with the policy goal of minimizing systemic risk”).
236. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 115 (noting that the loss of a hedge “can
harm the firm’s operations and its other creditors”).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 114.
240. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 141, at 758 (noting that preserving going-concern
surplus is “the thing the law of corporate reorganizations exists to preserve”).
241. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 115.
242. See Karen Brettell, Lehman CDS Counterparties Begin Resetting Trades, REUTERS,
Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/
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most scenarios in which the Safe Harbor applies, insurance-like CDSs
243
are not practically fungible. And in some cases,”[t]he [replacement]
premium may be so high that the firm can no longer hedge certain
risks; as a result, firm value may fall, to the detriment of all
244
creditors.” Termination under the Safe Harbor is not always a “no
245
harm, no foul” scenario; it can result in serious consequences to the
debtor and its creditors. As such, it has systemic risk implications.
F

F

F

F

F

F

B. Potential Problems with Narrowing the Safe Harbor
The task of narrowing the Safe Harbor is not without issues.
First, it is unclear whether the reasoning behind exempting hedging
CDSs from the Safe Harbor would necessarily extend to other
hedging derivatives. Even if it does, there is little need to change the
regulation of other derivatives markets without evidence that they are
malfunctioning. Regardless of whether the reasoning behind this
approach would apply to other derivatives, CDSs are uniquely in
need of special treatment (as evidenced by their role in the economic
crisis of 2008 and 2009).
Second, the Bankruptcy Code generally avoids rules that
differentiate between contracts “based on the subject matter of the
246
transaction.”
As such, this proposal runs contrary to the
Bankruptcy Code’s general disapproval of inquiry into the substance
247
of derivatives contracts. A narrowed Safe Harbor would almost
necessarily rely on a court’s assessment of the substance of the
contract, clouding the bankruptcy settlement process with uncertainty
F

F

F

F

idUSN1529868020080915 (noting that, for CDSs terminated as a result of the Lehman
bankruptcy, entering into replacement CDSs would “for some protection buyers . . . be in many
cases significantly more expensive”).
243. The analogy to insurance proves useful here: if an insurance provider were able to
terminate an insurance policy with a bankrupt policyholder, it is unlikely that the debtor would
be able to find a replacement policy without demonstrating the ability to pay a premium to
compensate the new provider for dealing with the risks of a firm in bankruptcy. And if the
debtor is unable to afford the increased cost of a new policy, the firm is exposed to the risk
against which it was previously insured.
244. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 27, at 115.
245. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 10, at 1049–50 (reaching a similar conclusion based on
the likelihood of opportunistic behavior under the Safe Harbor). But see Edwards & Morrison,
supra note 27, at 115 (reaching the opposite conclusion).
246. Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy
Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 641, 663 (2005) (discussing potential problems posed by the kind of rule that
differentiates between contracts in this way).
247. Id. at 664.
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248

as to the rights of the counterparties. As a result, the transaction
costs of entering into a CDS would likely rise if parties sought to
define ex ante whether the economic substance of a particular CDS
would subject it to the automatic stay. Such a rule would also likely
increase the cost of purchasing a CDS in order to compensate for ex
post uncertainty. But it makes little sense for the Bankruptcy Code to
treat derivatives as though they are all identical, especially when
differentiating between contracts could help the Code meet its goal of
reducing systemic risk.
F

F

CONCLUSION
Put simply, the case for narrowing the Safe Harbor rests on the
premise that different contracts have different values in different
circumstances. This Note argues that the Safe Harbor would more
effectively reduce systemic risk if it did not exempt all CDSs from
bankruptcy proceedings. Insurance-like CDSs are likely more
valuable in the debtor’s hands than in the counterparty’s hands. The
Safe Harbor ignores the possibility that such a disparity in value may
exist, presupposing instead that, in the aggregate, the value of
liquidity outweighs the costs inflicted by opportunistic behavior or the
grab race for the debtor’s assets. The Safe Harbor should not ignore
the possibility that this disparity in value exists because, if it does
exist, the Safe Harbor may allow counterparties to unnecessarily
damage the debtor and increase the probability that debtor firms will
fall deeper into a liquidity crisis with the potential to affect the larger
market. The Safe Harbor’s sanctioning of such costs is at crosspurposes with Congress’s intent to reduce systemic risk.
Narrowing the Safe Harbor could have widespread beneficial
249
consequences. The notional value, or “amount that is used to
calculate payments made on swaps and other risk management
250
products,” of the CDS market was “$54.6 trillion in the first half of
F

F

F

F

248. See id. (arguing that broad definitions prevent analysis based on substance and limit the
role of the judge to working with formal definitions).
249. The notional value generally overstates the true amount of the investment at stake, as
“the notional amount does not trade hands and is not at risk.” Romano, supra note 48, at 46.
But because the true size of the OTC market is difficult to ascertain, the best measure available
is in terms of notional value. Id. at 4 (explaining that the difficulty in quantifying the OTC
derivative market exists “because there is no accurate mechanism for tracking” it).
250. InvestorDictionary.com, Notional Amount, http://www.investordictionary.com/
definition/notional+amount.aspx (last visited Nov. 21, 2009).
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251

2008.” With major bankruptcy proceedings probable in the near
future, there are huge amounts of money at stake. But even more
importantly, the change proposed by this Note might help protect the
American economy from systemic failure and make the financial
system stronger going forward.
F

F

251. Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n., Summaries of Market Survey Results: 2008 MidYear Market Survey, http://www.isda.org/statistics/recent.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2009).

